Towards Cyber Resilience of Cyber-Physical Systems using Tiny Twins

Abstract—We propose a method to detect attacks on sensor data and control commands in cyber-physical systems. We develop a monitor module that uses an abstract digital twin, Tiny Twin, to detect false sensor data and faulty control commands. The Tiny Twin is a state transition system that represents the observable behavior of the system. The monitor observes the sensor data and the control commands transmitted in the network, walks over the Tiny Twin and checks whether the observed data and commands are consistent with the transitions in the Tiny Twin. The monitor produces an alarm when an attack is detected. The Tiny Twin is built automatically based on a timed actor code of the system. We demonstrate the method and evaluate it in detecting attacks using a temperature control system.The poster was accepted at the 7th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (Euro S&P 2022) and presented in the poster session. Original poster: https://ieeeeurosp.github.io/2022/posters