Security Measures Abroad and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations

International human rights law (IHRL) was initiated after the Second World War as part of public international law, which in turn had been based on the Westphalian concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty. As a result, IHRL has been informed by this territorial paradigm: A state is, first and foremost, obligated to respect, protect and fulfil human rights of those located on its territory. In light of today’s globalization processes, the enormous social, political and economic transnational interdependence, and risks and opportunities entailed by new means of communication and technology, this approach creates a protection vacuum. Targeted killings by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or trans-border surveillance systems, as the paramount examples of security interventions of our time, reflect this: Today, states can violate human rights without having to set foot on the territory the victim resides on. Extraterritorial intelligence strategies that establish “legal black holes” are on the rise. Not only cyber-attacks and big data but also terrorism, climate change or global migration all intro-duce novel dimensions of security challenges and multiply the scope of individuals a state can and does affect – at home as well as abroad. The security-related measures states adopt in these domains often come into conflict with human rights. In which way does the foundational idea that state conduct is constrained by human rights also pertain to these transnational, diagonal relations between states and “outsiders”? This contribution intends to comment on the legitimacy of states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations from the perspective of legal philosophy