In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to 'cheat' and exploit its partner. Under these asymmetric conditions, a simple model predicts that variation in the temptation to cheat and in the potential victim's capacity for partner control leads to shifts between exploitation and cooperation. Here, we show that the threat of early termination of an interaction was sufficient to induce cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus to feed selectively against their preference (which corresponds to cooperatively eating client fish ectoparasites), provided that their preference for alternative food was weak. Under opposite conditions, cleaners fed selectively according to their own preference (which corr...
Although cooperating individuals may gain benefits, they risk being cheated by their allies. Therefo...
Service providers may vary service quality depending on whether they work alone or provide the servi...
SummaryHumans may help others even in situations where the recipient will not reciprocate [1–5]. In ...
In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to ‘c...
In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to ‘c...
In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to ‘c...
In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to 'c...
There is a wealth of game theoretical approaches to the evolution and maintenance of cooperation bet...
How can cooperation persist if, for one partner, cheating is more profitable than cooperation in eac...
What are the mechanisms that prevent partners from cheating in potentially cooperative interactions ...
Deviations from model-based predictions of strategies leading to stable cooperation between unrelate...
Deviations from model-based predictions of strategies leading to stable cooperation between unrelate...
Interspecific mutualisms are an essential feature of life on earth, yet we know little about their e...
Although cooperating individuals may gain benefits, they risk being cheated by their allies. Therefo...
Although cooperating individuals may gain benefits, they risk being cheated by their allies. Therefo...
Although cooperating individuals may gain benefits, they risk being cheated by their allies. Therefo...
Service providers may vary service quality depending on whether they work alone or provide the servi...
SummaryHumans may help others even in situations where the recipient will not reciprocate [1–5]. In ...
In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to ‘c...
In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to ‘c...
In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to ‘c...
In many instances of cooperation, only one individual has both the potential and the incentive to 'c...
There is a wealth of game theoretical approaches to the evolution and maintenance of cooperation bet...
How can cooperation persist if, for one partner, cheating is more profitable than cooperation in eac...
What are the mechanisms that prevent partners from cheating in potentially cooperative interactions ...
Deviations from model-based predictions of strategies leading to stable cooperation between unrelate...
Deviations from model-based predictions of strategies leading to stable cooperation between unrelate...
Interspecific mutualisms are an essential feature of life on earth, yet we know little about their e...
Although cooperating individuals may gain benefits, they risk being cheated by their allies. Therefo...
Although cooperating individuals may gain benefits, they risk being cheated by their allies. Therefo...
Although cooperating individuals may gain benefits, they risk being cheated by their allies. Therefo...
Service providers may vary service quality depending on whether they work alone or provide the servi...
SummaryHumans may help others even in situations where the recipient will not reciprocate [1–5]. In ...