In defense of empathy: A response to Prinz

A prevailing view in moral psychology holds that empathy and sympathy play key roles inmorality and in prosocial and altruistic actions. Recently, Jesse Prinz (2011a, 2011b) haschallenged this view and has argued that empathy does not play a foundational or causalrole in morality. He suggests that in fact the presence of empathetic emotions is harmful tomorality. Prinz rejects all theories that connect empathy and morality as a constitutional,epistemological, developmental, motivational, or normative necessity. I consider two ofPrinz’s theses: the thesis that empathy is not necessary for moral development, and thethesis that empathy should be avoided as a guide for morality. Based on recent researchin moral psychology, I argue that empathy plays a crucial role in development of moralagency. I also argue that empathy is desirable as a moral emotion