(In)Justice and Morality. A commentary on Christoph Horn’s Paper

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2014v13n1p18The paper is a commentary on Christoph Horn’s paper The Concept of Justice. It criticizes Horn’s claim that justice is overrated in contemporary philosophical debate by discussing Horn’s arguments. In doing so, it questions (1) the idea that we can easily distinguish between morally central and peripheral questions, as Horn claims; it points out (2) that this distinction is based on the values held by those who are drawing it; and finally (3) it stresses the centrality of the feeling of outrage provoked by the action whose acceptability is being challenged. Finally, it claims that morality arises from the experience of injustice and, therefore, that questions of justice are not only morally central; they are, rather, essential to morality. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2014v13n1p18The paper is a commentary on Christoph Horn’s paper The Concept of Justice. It criticizes Horn’s claim that justice is overrated in contemporary philosophical debate by discussing Horn’s arguments. In doing so, it questions (1) the idea that we can easily distinguish between morally central and peripheral questions, as Horn claims; it points out (2) that this distinction is based on the values held by those who are drawing it; and finally (3) it stresses the centrality of the feeling of outrage provoked by the action whose acceptability is being challenged. Finally, it claims that morality arises from the experience of injustice and, therefore, that questions of justice are not only morally central; they are, rather, essential to morality.