Improbabilism

The free will debate is usually about its compatibility with determinism, or how it relates to moral responsibility. In this paper, I take a different approach, one focused on the metaphysical possibility of free will in our world. I first make clear which facet of free will is being discussed, then move on to my positive argument that it is improbable we live in one of the possible worlds where free will exists. I do so by providing two necessary conditions for free will: the ability to do otherwise and the ability to sufficiently determine our actions. These necessary conditions lie on opposite sides of the probability spectrum such that it renders them improbably compossible. The ability to do otherwise lies closer to the .5 point on the scale, whereas sufficient determining actions lies much closer to 1. Our understanding of our world leads us to grant sufficient determinism according to our nomological laws. This doesn’t push the possibility of free will out of the window. Instead, it allows for the possibility of it in our world, but only in an improbable fashion.Bachelor of Art