In 2005, Wen et al. proposed the first provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange using Weil pairings, and provided their proof in a modified Bellare-Rogaway model (BR-model). Here, we show an impersonation attack on Wen et al.¡¦s scheme and point out a main flaw of their model that allows a man-in-the-middle adversary easily violate the security
peer reviewedWe study three-party, password-authenticated key exchange protocols where the trusted t...
Key exchange protocols allow two or more parties communicating over a public network to establish a ...
AbstractAuthenticated key agreement protocols are to authenticate the users who will start a convers...
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authen...
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authen...
In this article we show that Shim¡¦s new ID-based tripartite multiple-key agreement protocol still s...
We observe that the definitions of security in the computational complexity proof models of Bellare ...
One round three-party authenticated key exchange protocols are extremely important to secure communi...
Recently, a number of ID-based two-party authenticated key agreement protocols which make of bilinea...
We propose a new password-based 3-party protocol with a formal security proof in the standard model....
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction...
Protocols for password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE) in the three-party setting allow two c...
We study the problem of secure key establishment. We critically examine the security models of Bella...
We study the problem of secure key establishment. We critically examine the security models of Bella...
We observe that the definitions of security in the computational complexity proof models of Bellare ...
peer reviewedWe study three-party, password-authenticated key exchange protocols where the trusted t...
Key exchange protocols allow two or more parties communicating over a public network to establish a ...
AbstractAuthenticated key agreement protocols are to authenticate the users who will start a convers...
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authen...
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authen...
In this article we show that Shim¡¦s new ID-based tripartite multiple-key agreement protocol still s...
We observe that the definitions of security in the computational complexity proof models of Bellare ...
One round three-party authenticated key exchange protocols are extremely important to secure communi...
Recently, a number of ID-based two-party authenticated key agreement protocols which make of bilinea...
We propose a new password-based 3-party protocol with a formal security proof in the standard model....
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction...
Protocols for password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE) in the three-party setting allow two c...
We study the problem of secure key establishment. We critically examine the security models of Bella...
We study the problem of secure key establishment. We critically examine the security models of Bella...
We observe that the definitions of security in the computational complexity proof models of Bellare ...
peer reviewedWe study three-party, password-authenticated key exchange protocols where the trusted t...
Key exchange protocols allow two or more parties communicating over a public network to establish a ...
AbstractAuthenticated key agreement protocols are to authenticate the users who will start a convers...