In [Eurocrypt 2004] Katz and Ostrovsky establish the exact round complexity of secure two-party computation with respect to black-box proofs of security. They prove that 5 rounds are necessary for secure two-party protocols (4-round are sufficient if only one party receives the output) and provide a protocol that matches such lower bound. The main challenge when designing such protocol is to parallelize the proofs of consistency provided by both parties – necessary when security against malicious adversaries is considered– in 4 rounds. Toward this goal they employ specific proofs in which the statement can be unspecified till the last round but that require non-black-box access to the underlying primitives. A rich line of work [IKLP06, Hai0...
A central direction of research in secure multiparty computation with dishonest majority has been to...
In this paper we study the question of what security is achievable for stand-alone two-party computa...
Two main goals of modern cryptography are to identify the minimal assumptions necessary to construct...
In [Eurocrypt 2004] Katz and Ostrovsky establish the exact round complexity of secure two-party comp...
In this work we continue the study on the round complexity of secure two-party computation with blac...
We revisit the exact round complexity of secure two-party computation. While four rounds are known t...
We consider the question of minimizing the round complexity of protocols for secure multiparty compu...
Katz and Ostrovsky (Crypto 2004) proved that five rounds are necessary for stand-alone general black...
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) allows a set of parties, each having its own private data, to co...
There has been a large body of work characterizing the round complexity of general-purpose malicious...
In this paper, we study the question of whether or not it is possible to construct protocols for gen...
We give constructions of three-round secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols for general funct...
It is well known that the secure computation of non-trivial functionalities in the setting of no hon...
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a central cryptographic task that allows a set of mutually d...
In this dissertation, we study the round complexity of cryptographic protocols, giving special atten...
A central direction of research in secure multiparty computation with dishonest majority has been to...
In this paper we study the question of what security is achievable for stand-alone two-party computa...
Two main goals of modern cryptography are to identify the minimal assumptions necessary to construct...
In [Eurocrypt 2004] Katz and Ostrovsky establish the exact round complexity of secure two-party comp...
In this work we continue the study on the round complexity of secure two-party computation with blac...
We revisit the exact round complexity of secure two-party computation. While four rounds are known t...
We consider the question of minimizing the round complexity of protocols for secure multiparty compu...
Katz and Ostrovsky (Crypto 2004) proved that five rounds are necessary for stand-alone general black...
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) allows a set of parties, each having its own private data, to co...
There has been a large body of work characterizing the round complexity of general-purpose malicious...
In this paper, we study the question of whether or not it is possible to construct protocols for gen...
We give constructions of three-round secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols for general funct...
It is well known that the secure computation of non-trivial functionalities in the setting of no hon...
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a central cryptographic task that allows a set of mutually d...
In this dissertation, we study the round complexity of cryptographic protocols, giving special atten...
A central direction of research in secure multiparty computation with dishonest majority has been to...
In this paper we study the question of what security is achievable for stand-alone two-party computa...
Two main goals of modern cryptography are to identify the minimal assumptions necessary to construct...