In this paper we develop symbolic and computational representations for a class of cryptographic modes of operation, where the symbolic representations are modeled as elements of a term algebra, and we apply them to the analysis of the computational security of the modes. We derive two different conditions on the symbolic representations, a simple one that is sufficient for security, and a more complex one that is both necessary and sufficient, and prove that these properties hold. The problem of deciding computational security then is reduced to the problem of solving certain disunification problems. We also discuss how these results can be extended
In this paper, mostly consisting of definitions, we revisit the models of security protocols: we sho...
The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cry...
Security protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over a public network. Thei...
Symbolic methods for reasoning about the security of cryptographic systems have for some time concen...
International audienceSince the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security pro...
Formalization and modeling are important topics in cryptography. They are crucial for precisely def...
Two different models for security of cryptographic protocols have been developed: Symbolic security ...
In Eurocrypt 2010, Miccinacio initiated an investigation of cryptographically sound, symbolic securi...
We have been developing a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security propert...
International audienceWe show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attacke...
International audienceRecently, Bana and Comon-Lundh introduced the notion of computationally comple...
We show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers proposed by Bana a...
Abstract. Symbolic and computational models are the two families of models for rigorously analysing ...
We consider the question of the adequacy of symbolic models versus computational models for the veri...
Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are wid...
In this paper, mostly consisting of definitions, we revisit the models of security protocols: we sho...
The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cry...
Security protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over a public network. Thei...
Symbolic methods for reasoning about the security of cryptographic systems have for some time concen...
International audienceSince the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security pro...
Formalization and modeling are important topics in cryptography. They are crucial for precisely def...
Two different models for security of cryptographic protocols have been developed: Symbolic security ...
In Eurocrypt 2010, Miccinacio initiated an investigation of cryptographically sound, symbolic securi...
We have been developing a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security propert...
International audienceWe show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attacke...
International audienceRecently, Bana and Comon-Lundh introduced the notion of computationally comple...
We show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers proposed by Bana a...
Abstract. Symbolic and computational models are the two families of models for rigorously analysing ...
We consider the question of the adequacy of symbolic models versus computational models for the veri...
Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are wid...
In this paper, mostly consisting of definitions, we revisit the models of security protocols: we sho...
The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cry...
Security protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over a public network. Thei...