Add to ORKGWe study the memory-tightness of security reductions in public-key cryptography, focusing in particular on Hashed ElGamal. We prove that any straightline (i.e., without rewinding) black-box reduction needs memory which grows linearly with the number of queries of the adversary it has access to, as long as this reduction treats the underlying group generically. This makes progress towards proving a conjecture by Auerbach et al. (CRYPTO 2017), and is also the first lower bound on memory-tightness for a concrete cryptographic scheme (as opposed to generalized reductions across security notions). Our proof relies on compression arguments in the generic group model
We consider a recent security definition of Chenette, Lewi, Weis, and Wu for order-revealing encrypt...
We revisit the question of constructing public-key encryption and signature schemes with security in...
Memory-hard functions (MHFs) is a class of hash functions whose fast evaluation requires the heavy u...
Cryptographic reductions typically aim to be tight by transforming an adversary A into an algorithm ...
This paper initiates the study of the provable security of authenticated encryption (AE) in the memo...
Memory tightness of reductions in cryptography, in addition to the standard tightness related to adv...
Recently it was conjectured that an ElGamal-based public-key encryption scheme with stateful decrypt...
Assuming a cryptographically strong cyclic group G of prime order q and a random hash function H, we...
In this work we deal with the problem of how to squeeze multiple ciphertexts without losing original...
We construct the first public-key encryption scheme whose chosen-ciphertext (i.e., IND-CCA) security...
Provable security refers to the ability to give rigorous mathematical proofs towards the security of...
In the first part of the thesis we show black-box separations in public and private-key cryptography...
Memory-hard functions (MHFs) are hash algorithms whose evaluation cost is dominated by memory cost. ...
Since the seminal work of Garg et. al (FOCS\u2713) in which they proposed the first candidate constr...
In structure-preserving cryptography, every building block shares the same bilinear groups. These gr...
We consider a recent security definition of Chenette, Lewi, Weis, and Wu for order-revealing encrypt...
We revisit the question of constructing public-key encryption and signature schemes with security in...
Memory-hard functions (MHFs) is a class of hash functions whose fast evaluation requires the heavy u...
Cryptographic reductions typically aim to be tight by transforming an adversary A into an algorithm ...
This paper initiates the study of the provable security of authenticated encryption (AE) in the memo...
Memory tightness of reductions in cryptography, in addition to the standard tightness related to adv...
Recently it was conjectured that an ElGamal-based public-key encryption scheme with stateful decrypt...
Assuming a cryptographically strong cyclic group G of prime order q and a random hash function H, we...
In this work we deal with the problem of how to squeeze multiple ciphertexts without losing original...
We construct the first public-key encryption scheme whose chosen-ciphertext (i.e., IND-CCA) security...
Provable security refers to the ability to give rigorous mathematical proofs towards the security of...
In the first part of the thesis we show black-box separations in public and private-key cryptography...
Memory-hard functions (MHFs) are hash algorithms whose evaluation cost is dominated by memory cost. ...
Since the seminal work of Garg et. al (FOCS\u2713) in which they proposed the first candidate constr...
In structure-preserving cryptography, every building block shares the same bilinear groups. These gr...
We consider a recent security definition of Chenette, Lewi, Weis, and Wu for order-revealing encrypt...
We revisit the question of constructing public-key encryption and signature schemes with security in...
Memory-hard functions (MHFs) is a class of hash functions whose fast evaluation requires the heavy u...