The Materialization of the EU’s Code of Practice on Disinformation : Problems, Policies, and Politics

Disinformation has recently taken priority in media policy agendas across the world as many governing bodies identified it as an emerging threat to democracy. The EU has been particularly lauded for its proactive and comprehensive approach. Most notably, the EU launched their Code of Practice on Disinformation, the first and only disinformation policy on an international scale. This study focuses on analyzing the factors that determined the materialization of the Code through the lens of the multiple streams framework. The research material consists of semi-structured interviews with members of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation as well as signatories of the Code, both of which were directly involved in the Code’s development process. The data was analyzed through a qualitative thematic analysis, with the themes mainly grounded in the three streams of the multiple streams framework – the problem stream, policy stream, and political stream. The Code’s materialization resulted from the concurrence of increased attention to disinformation as a policy problem, the development of viable solutions, and the emergence of political will and competence to address the issue. Disinformation was successfully framed as an emerging threat to democracy through focusing events such as the 2016 U.S. elections, the Brexit Referendum, and the COVID-19 pandemic, rather than particular indicators that revealed the problem’s scope and impact. Solutions were based on consensus-building among conflicting interest groups, in addition to an assessment on each proposal’s viability in terms of value acceptability, resource availability, technical and financial feasibility, and anticipation of future constraints. Although the Code remained a non-legislative policy with vague language, the discussions generated alternative solutions that could be used in future policy windows. Lastly, the composition of the EU, lobbying efforts of interest groups, and the EU’s perception of the public mood, among other factors, contributed to both the Code’s acceptance and limitations in the political sphere. The materialization of the Code, despite its shortcomings, suggests that the EU is willing to take more aggressive measures against disinformation through incremental adjustments. The findings of this study provide valuable insights into the complexities of media policy-making as well as the challenges of tackling disinformation in the digital age