Testing for Imperfeet Competition on EU Deposit and Loan Markets with Bresnahan’s Market Power Model

Bresnahan and Lau developed a model of profit maximising oligopoly banks in order to determine the degree of market power of the average bank. The equilibrium price equation includes a mark up, which is not used at all under perfect competition, partly used under oligopoly or monopolistic competition and fully used under monopoly. The data requirements of the model allow testing of possible use of market power for submarkets. This article investigates the degree of competition on both the deposit and loan markets in nine EU countries, both apart and jointly. The hypothesis of perfect competition can be rejected for the deposit market of the “entire” EU, for the deposit markets of Germany and Spain and for the lending markets of Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Nevertheless, these markets are characterised as highly competitive, because the use or abuse of market power is very limited. (JEL E43, E51, F36, G21, L1