ハンダンリョク ト ソノ タイショウ : トクシュナ モノ オ メグル カント ノ シサク

In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant defined the power of judgment as 'the faculty for thinking of the particular (das Besondere) as contained under the universal (das Allgemeine).' But, the meaning of the term 'particular' has often been confused with that of another term 'singular'. In this paper, I propose an interpretation of the former that enables us to give a coherent reading of the Critique. To sum up the conclusion, 'the particular' that requires the reflective power of judgment is a certain perception or an emprical intuition in so far as we already have some but insufficient determination of what it is. In other words, according to Kant's theory of judgment, there are no 'singular' objects that have no relation to general concepts or rules and await our initial judgments