The moral case for intelligent speed adaptation

Speeding is a major problem in road safety. Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) is a potential solution, but the moral acceptability of ISA has been called into question both in the popular media and in academic discussions. In this article, a moral case is made for making warning and limiting versions of ISA obligatory in all cars.The practice of car driving involves frequent speeding, which imposes unacceptable risks of harm on other road users. In this article, I argue that ISA can therefore be justified on the basis of the harm it prevents, as is the current criminalisation of speeding. I defend obligatory ISA against three objections. First, ISA is likely to introduce some additional risk for drivers.However, drivers should accept these risks to reduce the risks from driving for other parties to an acceptable level. Second, although limiting ISA reduces drivers’ options for moral agency and exercising self-restraint to some extent, this consequence is defensible.Third, accepting ISA does not commit us to accepting an entire range of other behaviour-regulating technologies.