In this work we present an evolving system of agents which interact with each other in game theoretic settings. The parameters of the game are considered as time dependent variables representing state of the external environment. The variation of these parameters covers four canonical examples from game theory: prisoners dilemma, hawk-dove, stag-hunt and harmony game. The process of selfadaptation of the proposed system as well as its adaptation to the changing parameters of the environment is considered. We have demonstrated that the introduced system can be in different states which determine the way the system adapts to the external conditions. Stability of these states with respect to the variation of the external conditions has been st...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mode...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents that are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mod...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mode...
In this work we present an evolving system of agents which interact with each other in game theoreti...
In this work we present an evolving system of agents which interact with each other in game theoreti...
Abstract—In this work we present an evolving system of agents which interact with each other in game...
Most modern computer games provide a virtual environment as a context for player interaction. Recen...
A model of learning and adaptation is used to analyze the coevolution of strategies in the repeated ...
The goal of a self-interested agent within a multi-agent system is to maximize its utility over time...
We study evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game involving a one-step memory mechanism of the i...
We describe a general mechanism for adaptation in multiagent systems in which agents modify their be...
Recent video games have become so complex and highly qualified that non-player characters, called NP...
This paper presents the use of automata with multiplicities for the modelization of agent behaviours...
A learning rule is adaptive if it is simple to compute, requires little information about the action...
There are formalisms in literature where behavior can be described by a finite set of rules that map...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mode...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents that are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mod...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mode...
In this work we present an evolving system of agents which interact with each other in game theoreti...
In this work we present an evolving system of agents which interact with each other in game theoreti...
Abstract—In this work we present an evolving system of agents which interact with each other in game...
Most modern computer games provide a virtual environment as a context for player interaction. Recen...
A model of learning and adaptation is used to analyze the coevolution of strategies in the repeated ...
The goal of a self-interested agent within a multi-agent system is to maximize its utility over time...
We study evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game involving a one-step memory mechanism of the i...
We describe a general mechanism for adaptation in multiagent systems in which agents modify their be...
Recent video games have become so complex and highly qualified that non-player characters, called NP...
This paper presents the use of automata with multiplicities for the modelization of agent behaviours...
A learning rule is adaptive if it is simple to compute, requires little information about the action...
There are formalisms in literature where behavior can be described by a finite set of rules that map...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mode...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents that are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mod...
We present a model of adaptive economic agents who are k periods forward looking. Agents in our mode...