Add to ORKGThis study explores selection neglect in an experimental investment game where individuals can learn from others' outcomes. Experiment 1 examines aggregate-level equilibrium behavior. We find strong evidence of selection neglect and corroborate several comparative static predictions of Jehiel's (2018) model, showing that the severity of the bias is aggravated by the sophistication of other individuals and moderated when information is more correlated across individuals. Experiment 2 focuses on individual decision-making, isolating the influence of beliefs from possible confounding factors. This allows us to classify individuals according to their degree of naivety and explore the limits of, and potential remedies for, selection neglect
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People often extrapolate from data samples, inferring properties of the population like the rate of ...
An ever increasing number of experiments attempts to elicit risk preferences of a population of inte...
IInformation sampling is often biased towards seeking evidence that confirms one’s prior beliefs. De...
This paper reports experimental evidence from a Dictator Game experiment in which subjects choose re...
Information sampling is often biased towards seeking evidence that confirms one's prior beliefs. Des...
This paper reports an experimental test of how, when observing others' actions, participants learn m...
Empirical studies of games typically rely on Nash Equilibrium. However, such solution concept is rej...
Most papers that employ the strategy method (SM) use many observations per subject to study response...
<div><p>Information sampling is often biased towards seeking evidence that confirms one’s prior beli...
Nash equilibrium takes optimization as a primitive, but suboptimal behavior can persist in simple st...
There are many important decision problems where learning through experimentation is costly or impos...
People often extrapolate from data samples, inferring properties of the population like the rate of ...
n a simple experimental environment a group of subjects was asked to give estimates of a second grou...
We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, stat...
People often extrapolate from data samples, inferring properties of the population like the rate of ...
An ever increasing number of experiments attempts to elicit risk preferences of a population of inte...
IInformation sampling is often biased towards seeking evidence that confirms one’s prior beliefs. De...
This paper reports experimental evidence from a Dictator Game experiment in which subjects choose re...
Information sampling is often biased towards seeking evidence that confirms one's prior beliefs. Des...
This paper reports an experimental test of how, when observing others' actions, participants learn m...
Empirical studies of games typically rely on Nash Equilibrium. However, such solution concept is rej...
Most papers that employ the strategy method (SM) use many observations per subject to study response...
<div><p>Information sampling is often biased towards seeking evidence that confirms one’s prior beli...
Nash equilibrium takes optimization as a primitive, but suboptimal behavior can persist in simple st...