Economc rationality and the winner's curse In this paper, we study the phenomenon known as the « winner's curse » in common value auction models. A simulation model allows to distinguish between the winner's curse (consequence of an a priori error on the expected value of the item) and the post decision surprise (when the a posteriori profit is compared with the a priori profit). We show that an optimal strategy can avoid the winner's curse but not all possibilities of regret.Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique Cet article examine le phénomène de la malédiction du vainqueur dans les procédures d'appel d'offres. Un modèle de simulation permet de distinguer la malédiction (due à une erreur d'évaluation a priori de la valeur...
Initial valuations of entrepreneurial ventures offering uncertain payoffs can often be overvalued by...
We examine behavior in a Coasian contracting game with incomplete information. Experimental subjects...
We report the results of a series of second-price auction experiments where each bidder's signal is ...
Economc rationality and the winner's curse In this paper, we study the phenomenon known as the « w...
The winner's curse in auctions The winner's curse is a plienomenon which appears in sealed bid auc...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...
This paper analyzes an auction in which bidders see independent components of a common prize value. ...
There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract informat...
There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract informat...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...
This paper presents a replication and extension of experiments with the "winner's curse" which were ...
The Winner’s Curse (WC) is one of the most robust and persistent deviations fromtheoretical predicti...
While most models of auctions and competitive bidding assume that each bidder's utility for an outco...
Abstract: In common value auctions the winning bid often exceeds the value of the good purchased. T...
Abstract: We investigate experimentally a possible Winner’s Curse in a generalized environment with ...
Initial valuations of entrepreneurial ventures offering uncertain payoffs can often be overvalued by...
We examine behavior in a Coasian contracting game with incomplete information. Experimental subjects...
We report the results of a series of second-price auction experiments where each bidder's signal is ...
Economc rationality and the winner's curse In this paper, we study the phenomenon known as the « w...
The winner's curse in auctions The winner's curse is a plienomenon which appears in sealed bid auc...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...
This paper analyzes an auction in which bidders see independent components of a common prize value. ...
There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract informat...
There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract informat...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...
This paper presents a replication and extension of experiments with the "winner's curse" which were ...
The Winner’s Curse (WC) is one of the most robust and persistent deviations fromtheoretical predicti...
While most models of auctions and competitive bidding assume that each bidder's utility for an outco...
Abstract: In common value auctions the winning bid often exceeds the value of the good purchased. T...
Abstract: We investigate experimentally a possible Winner’s Curse in a generalized environment with ...
Initial valuations of entrepreneurial ventures offering uncertain payoffs can often be overvalued by...
We examine behavior in a Coasian contracting game with incomplete information. Experimental subjects...
We report the results of a series of second-price auction experiments where each bidder's signal is ...