An ongoing debate about the differences between formal provability in an axiomatic system and informal provability of mathematical claims in mathematics as a whole resulted in the construction of various logics whose main purpose is to capture the inferential behaviour of the notion of informal provability, just as multiple logics of formal provability capture the behaviour of the concept of formal provability. Known logics of informal provability, based on classical logic, are unable to incorporate all intuitive principles of informal provability (most notably, reflection, which says that whatever is provable is true). One solution to this problem is to treat informal provability as an operator (Shapiro, 1985, North Holland; Reinhardt, 198...
When mathematicians discuss proofs, they rarely have a particular formal system in mind. Indeed, the...
The main goal of this paper is to provide an abstract framework for constructing proof systems for v...
There is a long tradition of logic, from Aristotle to Gödel, of understanding a proof from the conce...
An ongoing debate about the differences between formal provability in an axiomatic system and inform...
An ongoing debate about the differences between formal provability in an axiomatic system and inform...
Mathematicians prove theorems in a semi-formal setting, providing what we'll call informal proofs. T...
Mathematicians prove theorems in a semi-formal setting, providing what we'll call informal proofs. T...
Mathematicians prove theorems in a semi-formal setting, providing what we'll call informal proofs. T...
BAT is a logic built to capture the inferential behavior of informal provability. Ultimately, the lo...
Classical logic of formal provability includes Lob's theorem, but not reflection. In contrast, intui...
Classical logic of formal provability includes Lob's theorem, but not reflection. In contrast, intui...
Provability logics are, roughly speaking, modal logics meant to capture the formal principles of var...
Recently, in an ongoing debate about informal provability, non-deterministic logics of informal prov...
Provability logics are, roughly speaking, modal logics meant to capture the formal principles of var...
Provability logics are, roughly speaking, modal logics meant to capture the formal principles of var...
When mathematicians discuss proofs, they rarely have a particular formal system in mind. Indeed, the...
The main goal of this paper is to provide an abstract framework for constructing proof systems for v...
There is a long tradition of logic, from Aristotle to Gödel, of understanding a proof from the conce...
An ongoing debate about the differences between formal provability in an axiomatic system and inform...
An ongoing debate about the differences between formal provability in an axiomatic system and inform...
Mathematicians prove theorems in a semi-formal setting, providing what we'll call informal proofs. T...
Mathematicians prove theorems in a semi-formal setting, providing what we'll call informal proofs. T...
Mathematicians prove theorems in a semi-formal setting, providing what we'll call informal proofs. T...
BAT is a logic built to capture the inferential behavior of informal provability. Ultimately, the lo...
Classical logic of formal provability includes Lob's theorem, but not reflection. In contrast, intui...
Classical logic of formal provability includes Lob's theorem, but not reflection. In contrast, intui...
Provability logics are, roughly speaking, modal logics meant to capture the formal principles of var...
Recently, in an ongoing debate about informal provability, non-deterministic logics of informal prov...
Provability logics are, roughly speaking, modal logics meant to capture the formal principles of var...
Provability logics are, roughly speaking, modal logics meant to capture the formal principles of var...
When mathematicians discuss proofs, they rarely have a particular formal system in mind. Indeed, the...
The main goal of this paper is to provide an abstract framework for constructing proof systems for v...
There is a long tradition of logic, from Aristotle to Gödel, of understanding a proof from the conce...