Is left-libertarianism just a bad form of liberal-egalitarianism?

Since twenty years there has been a significant increase in literature in political theory about so-called ‘left-libertarianism’. Left-libertarianism is a theory of distributive justice which tries to combine liberty and equality by affirming both libertarian self-ownership rights and a liberal-egalitarian (re)distribution of resources. Therefore it is generally accepted as a middle ground between the two main contemporary theories of distributive justice: Rawls’s ‘Justice as Fairness’ and Nozick’s libertarianism (Fried, 2004; Rawls, 1999; Nozick, 1974). The main purpose of left-libertarians is to show that right-libertarian intuitions are consistent with equality and lead to a more egalitarian society than is generally assumed (Vallentyne e.a., 2005; Fried, 2005). In combining self-ownership and an egalitarian distribution of resources left-libertarians think they defend the most attractive theory of justice (Quong, 2011). Against liberal-egalitarians they argue that these theorists fail to give an account of how persons can become the justified owners of external resources and therefore do not provide a convincing theory of distributive justice (Vallentyne e.a., 2005). Against right-libertarians they claim that allowing an individual to acquire an unlimited amount of external resources fails to respect persons as moral equals (Cohen, 1995; Otsuka, 2003). All external resources are made of natural resources which can be seen as ‘manna from heaven’ (Nozick, 1974). As it is manna from heaven, no person is “born deserving a smaller share of the earth’s wealth, nor is anybody else naturally entitled to a larger than average share” (Arthur, 1987: 344). Therefore, left-libertarians argue, an egalitarian (re)distribution of resources ought to be an essential part of every theory of justice. In this paper I examine one of the main criticisms of left-libertarianism. Fried (2004) and Smith (2004) have argued that left-libertarianism is unsuccessful in combining liberal egalitarianism and right-libertarianism as, in the end, left-libertarianism is just a subdivision in the broad liberal egalitarian tradition, rather than a distinct middle way. Left-libertarians are hidden liberal egalitarians because their commitment to full self-ownership is not as strong as they pretend. Full self-ownership, Fried and Smith argue, cannot be combined coherently with either a luck-egalitarian principle or a more general goal to correct inequalities. Surprisingly, this is exactly what most left-libertarians seem to do (Fried, 2004; Smith, 2004). The kind of resources that ought to be equalized ranges from strict natural resources (early Steiner: Vallentyne & Steiner, 2000; Quong, 2011), to gifts, bequests, cultural heritage, well-functioning markets (Van Parijs, 1995) and germ-line genetic information (late Steiner: 1994). To support such a profound redistributive scheme, so the criticism continues, left-libertarians need to compromise their commitment to self-ownership such that they are left with no more than the reasonable conception of self-ownership that is protected in each liberal-egalitarian theory (e.g. Rawls, 2001: 75). Surprisingly, most left-libertarians do not consider this ‘egalitarian critique’ as defeating their theory. They argue left-libertarianism is indeed libertarian and liberal egalitarian at the same time (Vallentyne e.a., 2005: 211-212). Instead of being a middle way, these authors state left-libertarianism seeks common ground with liberal egalitarians. Being liberal egalitarian can, therefore, hardly be called a criticism at all (ibidem; Vallentyne, 2009). The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between left-libertarianism and liberal egalitarianism. In the end, the challenge of left-libertarianism is to show that self-ownership and equality can co-exist within a single theory (Quong, 2011: 67). Whether being left-libertarian and liberal egalitarian at the same time is incompatible with this challenge is clearly a matter of disagreement. After introducing left-libertarianism I will elaborate on what I call the ‘incoherence objection’ and elucidate the relationship between left-libertarianism and liberal egalitarianism. Thereafter I will focus on the luck-egalitarian nature of left-libertarianism and point out the challenges that thereby arise. I will argue, in contrast to Fried and Smith, that luck-egalitarianism is at the core of left-libertarian theory and, thus, that each such a theory could be expected to at least partly support this idea of equality. Finally, I address the second part of the criticism and agree with Fried and Smith that proper respect for full self-ownership does limit the equalizing goal a left-libertarian theory can have. I conclude that, for left-libertarians to add something distinctive to the theoretical debate about distributive justice, they ought to argue within a framework of luck-egalitarianism and a limited egalitarian commitment.Since twenty years there has been a significant increase in literature in political theory about so-called ‘left-libertarianism’. Left-libertarianism is a theory of distributive justice which tries to combine liberty and equality by affirming both libertarian self-ownership rights and a liberal-egalitarian (re)distribution of resources. Therefore it is generally accepted as a middle ground between the two main contemporary theories of distributive justice: Rawls’s ‘Justice as Fairness’ and Nozick’s libertarianism (Fried, 2004; Rawls, 1999; Nozick, 1974). The main purpose of left-libertarians is to show that right-libertarian intuitions are consistent with equality and lead to a more egalitarian society than is generally assumed (Vallentyne e.a., 2005; Fried, 2005). In combining self-ownership and an egalitarian distribution of resources left-libertarians think they defend the most attractive theory of justice (Quong, 2011). Against liberal-egalitarians they argue that these theorists fail to give an account of how persons can become the justified owners of external resources and therefore do not provide a convincing theory of distributive justice (Vallentyne e.a., 2005). Against right-libertarians they claim that allowing an individual to acquire an unlimited amount of external resources fails to respect persons as moral equals (Cohen, 1995; Otsuka, 2003). All external resources are made of natural resources which can be seen as ‘manna from heaven’ (Nozick, 1974). As it is manna from heaven, no person is “born deserving a smaller share of the earth’s wealth, nor is anybody else naturally entitled to a larger than average share” (Arthur, 1987: 344). Therefore, left-libertarians argue, an egalitarian (re)distribution of resources ought to be an essential part of every theory of justice. In this paper I examine one of the main criticisms of left-libertarianism. Fried (2004) and Smith (2004) have argued that left-libertarianism is unsuccessful in combining liberal egalitarianism and right-libertarianism as, in the end, left-libertarianism is just a subdivision in the broad liberal egalitarian tradition, rather than a distinct middle way. Left-libertarians are hidden liberal egalitarians because their commitment to full self-ownership is not as strong as they pretend. Full self-ownership, Fried and Smith argue, cannot be combined coherently with either a luck-egalitarian principle or a more general goal to correct inequalities. Surprisingly, this is exactly what most left-libertarians seem to do (Fried, 2004; Smith, 2004). The kind of resources that ought to be equalized ranges from strict natural resources (early Steiner: Vallentyne & Steiner, 2000; Quong, 2011), to gifts, bequests, cultural heritage, well-functioning markets (Van Parijs, 1995) and germ-line genetic information (late Steiner: 1994). To support such a profound redistributive scheme, so the criticism continues, left-libertarians need to compromise their commitment to self-ownership such that they are left with no more than the reasonable conception of self-ownership that is protected in each liberal-egalitarian theory (e.g. Rawls, 2001: 75). Surprisingly, most left-libertarians do not consider this ‘egalitarian critique’ as defeating their theory. They argue left-libertarianism is indeed libertarian and liberal egalitarian at the same time (Vallentyne e.a., 2005: 211-212). Instead of being a middle way, these authors state left-libertarianism seeks common ground with liberal egalitarians. Being liberal egalitarian can, therefore, hardly be called a criticism at all (ibidem; Vallentyne, 2009). The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between left-libertarianism and liberal egalitarianism. In the end, the challenge of left-libertarianism is to show that self-ownership and equality can co-exist within a single theory (Quong, 2011: 67). Whether being left-libertarian and liberal egalitarian at the same time is incompatible with this challenge is clearly a matter of disagreement. After introducing left-libertarianism I will elaborate on what I call the ‘incoherence objection’ and elucidate the relationship between left-libertarianism and liberal egalitarianism. Thereafter I will focus on the luck-egalitarian nature of left-libertarianism and point out the challenges that thereby arise. I will argue, in contrast to Fried and Smith, that luck-egalitarianism is at the core of left-libertarian theory and, thus, that each such a theory could be expected to at least partly support this idea of equality. Finally, I address the second part of the criticism and agree with Fried and Smith that proper respect for full self-ownership does limit the equalizing goal a left-libertarian theory can have. I conclude that, for left-libertarians to add something distinctive to the theoretical debate about distributive justice, they ought to argue within a framework of luck-egalitarianism and a limited egalitarian commitment.