Three essays on corporate voluntary disclosure

I examine whether management provides pessimistic earnings forecasts to guide analysts into walking down their estimates. I also investigate whether the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure improves analysts\u27 estimates and their influences on firms\u27 voluntary disclosures. Results show that analysts are less likely to support management by walking down their estimates and management is less likely to issue pessimistic forecasts for annual earnings forecasts. Furthermore, analysts are likely to walk down their estimates if they are more optimistic before the management forecasts. Analysts are likely to support management by lowering their estimates if management issues a pessimistic forecast. I find that after Regulation Fair Disclosure, management is less likely to issue pessimistic annual earnings forecasts, and in the mean time, analysts are less likely to walk down their estimates to support management. However, I do not find support that firms with high litigation risk or loss firms are more likely to provide pessimistic forecasts