Leibniz on the Metaphysical Certainty of Innate Ideas

In Leibniz’s New Essays stands out, within many important topics, his doctrine of innate ideas, which supposes the division between sense knowledge and innate knowledge and implies the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. That doctrine is particularly relevant for Leibniz’s philosophy but entails implicitly the epistemological difference between belief, on one side, and certainty, on the other. In this paper I outline, according to my interpretation, how Leibniz explains that humans can have certainty about innate ideas. This topic is important because if Leibniz demonstrates the possibility of having certainty of those ideas, then it is feasible to believe in its existence. However, if his explanation is unsatisfactory then his metaphysical doctrine would be seriously weakened and, at the same time, both skepticism and Locke’s empiricist doctrine would be reinforced