\u3cp\u3eFor the analysis of the dynamics of game playing populations, it is common practice to assume infinitely large populations. Infinite models yield predictions of fixed points and their stability properties. However, these models cannot demonstrate the influence of genetic drift, caused by stochastic sampling in small populations. Instead, we propose Markov models of finite populations for the analysis of genetic drift in games. With these exact models, we can study the stability of evolutionary stable strategies, and measure the influence of genetic drift in the long run. We show that genetic drift can introduce significant differences in the expectations of long term behavior.\u3c/p\u3
We consider an exponentially growing population of cells undergoing mutations and ask about the effe...
In this article we review a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocol...
Finite populations Stochastic effects a b s t r a c t We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-...
For the analysis of the dynamics of game playing populations, it is common practice to assume infini...
Finite Markov models of the evolution of finite populations can be used as a tool to study the theor...
The most common phenomena in the evolution process are natural selection and genetic drift. In this ...
Finite Markov models of the evolution of finite populations can be used as a tool to study the theor...
Finite Markov models of the evolution of finite populations can be used as a tool to study the theor...
Evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are often used to explain the behaviors of individuals and spe...
This paper has two purposes. The first is to describe the existing theory of long-run behavior of po...
Simple evolutionary models, like the Moran process or the Wright-Fisher process, have been used to m...
The geometric mean of fitness is considered to be the main indicator of evolutionary change in stoch...
Abstract. We present a general model of stochastic evolution in games played by large populations of...
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics for finite populations has recently been widely explored in th...
The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...
We consider an exponentially growing population of cells undergoing mutations and ask about the effe...
In this article we review a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocol...
Finite populations Stochastic effects a b s t r a c t We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-...
For the analysis of the dynamics of game playing populations, it is common practice to assume infini...
Finite Markov models of the evolution of finite populations can be used as a tool to study the theor...
The most common phenomena in the evolution process are natural selection and genetic drift. In this ...
Finite Markov models of the evolution of finite populations can be used as a tool to study the theor...
Finite Markov models of the evolution of finite populations can be used as a tool to study the theor...
Evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are often used to explain the behaviors of individuals and spe...
This paper has two purposes. The first is to describe the existing theory of long-run behavior of po...
Simple evolutionary models, like the Moran process or the Wright-Fisher process, have been used to m...
The geometric mean of fitness is considered to be the main indicator of evolutionary change in stoch...
Abstract. We present a general model of stochastic evolution in games played by large populations of...
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics for finite populations has recently been widely explored in th...
The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...
We consider an exponentially growing population of cells undergoing mutations and ask about the effe...
In this article we review a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocol...
Finite populations Stochastic effects a b s t r a c t We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-...