We consider bin packing games introduced by Faigle and Kern (1993) and we restrict ourselves to the subclass of games for which all bins have unit capacity and all items are larger than 1/3. We adopt the taxation model of Faigle and Kern and we prove that for a tax-rate of epsilon = 1/7 the E-core is always non empty. The bound is sharp, since for every epsilon <1/7 them exist instances of the bin packing game within our sublass with an empty epsilon-core.</p
Cooperation of individuals or institutions is often coupled with benefits that can be regarded as th...
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling o...
In this paper we study a general bin packing game with an interest matrix, which is a generalization...
We consider bin packing games introduced by Faigle and Kern (1993) and we restrict ourselves to the ...
A cooperative bin packing game is a $N$-person game, where the player set $N$ consists of $k$ bins o...
A cooperative bin packing game is an N -person game, where the player set N consists of k bins of ca...
A non-uniform bin packing game is an $N$-person cooperative game, where the set $N$ is defined by $k...
We investigate a cooperative game with two types of players envolved: Every player of the first type...
A cooperative (uniform) bin packing game is an N-person game, where the player set consists of k bin...
We introduce the concept of a paramaterized collection of games with side payments and determine a b...
A model of taxation for cooperativen-person games is introduced where proper coalitions Are taxed pr...
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilo...
We consider collections of games with and without side payments described by certain natural paramet...
We consider selfish colorful bin packing games in which a set of items, each one controlled by a sel...
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on E so t...
Cooperation of individuals or institutions is often coupled with benefits that can be regarded as th...
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling o...
In this paper we study a general bin packing game with an interest matrix, which is a generalization...
We consider bin packing games introduced by Faigle and Kern (1993) and we restrict ourselves to the ...
A cooperative bin packing game is a $N$-person game, where the player set $N$ consists of $k$ bins o...
A cooperative bin packing game is an N -person game, where the player set N consists of k bins of ca...
A non-uniform bin packing game is an $N$-person cooperative game, where the set $N$ is defined by $k...
We investigate a cooperative game with two types of players envolved: Every player of the first type...
A cooperative (uniform) bin packing game is an N-person game, where the player set consists of k bin...
We introduce the concept of a paramaterized collection of games with side payments and determine a b...
A model of taxation for cooperativen-person games is introduced where proper coalitions Are taxed pr...
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilo...
We consider collections of games with and without side payments described by certain natural paramet...
We consider selfish colorful bin packing games in which a set of items, each one controlled by a sel...
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on E so t...
Cooperation of individuals or institutions is often coupled with benefits that can be regarded as th...
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling o...
In this paper we study a general bin packing game with an interest matrix, which is a generalization...