Amodel of dynamic price competition is analyzed to assess howconsumer inertia may impact the ability of firms to sustain high prices. Three main consequences are identified: maintaining high prices does not require punishment strategies when firms are sufficientlymyopic; for sufficiently high levels of inertia, high prices can be sustained at all discount factors; and the ability to maintain high prices may depend non-monotonically on the level of the discount factor. Our findings offer implications for strategic firm behavior and public policy. For example, measures aiming to reduce the degree of consumer inertia are unambiguously effective in traditional markets, but may facilitate collusion in network industries.</p
This paper presents a model of dynamic price duopoly with short-term price inertia. A perturbation o...
Economic intuition suggests that increased competition generates lower prices. However, recent theor...
We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion. Our analysis clarifies exactly when...
Amodel of dynamic price competition is analyzed to assess howconsumer inertia may impact the ability...
We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where chosen prices poten...
We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where cho-sen prices pote...
We investigate price competition between firms in markets characterized by consumer variety seeking....
In this article, I analyze price competition under price inertia. After setting prices, sellers are ...
In a dynamic competition model where firms initially share half of the market and consumers have swi...
When two competitors dominate a given market, there is always a temptation for one competitor to cut...
This paper is an attempt to reconcile the – at first sight different – views on the determinants of ...
We analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long-run scale decisi...
This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing t...
This paper analyses dynamic pricing in markets with network externalities. Network externalities imp...
In imperfectly competitive network industries, firms' market shares are endogenously changing over t...
This paper presents a model of dynamic price duopoly with short-term price inertia. A perturbation o...
Economic intuition suggests that increased competition generates lower prices. However, recent theor...
We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion. Our analysis clarifies exactly when...
Amodel of dynamic price competition is analyzed to assess howconsumer inertia may impact the ability...
We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where chosen prices poten...
We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where cho-sen prices pote...
We investigate price competition between firms in markets characterized by consumer variety seeking....
In this article, I analyze price competition under price inertia. After setting prices, sellers are ...
In a dynamic competition model where firms initially share half of the market and consumers have swi...
When two competitors dominate a given market, there is always a temptation for one competitor to cut...
This paper is an attempt to reconcile the – at first sight different – views on the determinants of ...
We analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long-run scale decisi...
This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing t...
This paper analyses dynamic pricing in markets with network externalities. Network externalities imp...
In imperfectly competitive network industries, firms' market shares are endogenously changing over t...
This paper presents a model of dynamic price duopoly with short-term price inertia. A perturbation o...
Economic intuition suggests that increased competition generates lower prices. However, recent theor...
We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion. Our analysis clarifies exactly when...