We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid feeling guilt by letting down another player. We compare estimates of WTP under the assumption that higher-order beliefs are in equilibrium (i.e., consistent with the choice distribution) with models estimated using stated beliefs which relax the equilibrium requirement. We estimate WTP in the latter case by allowing stated beliefs to be correlated with guilt aversion, thus controlling for a possible source of a consensus effect. All models are estimated using data from an experiment of proposal and response conducted with a large and representative sample of the Dutch population. Our range of estimates suggests that responde...
We combine choice data in the ultimatum game with the expectations of proposers elicited by subjecti...
We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences ...
Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. For exampl...
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pa...
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pa...
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pa...
This Zenodo project contains the files necessary to replicate the results of our study "Measuring be...
How does guilt affect participation in providing public goods? We characterise and analyse completel...
Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and ...
We compare three approaches to test for guilt aversion in two economic experiments. The first approa...
We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations eli...
We compare three approaches to test for guilt aversion in two economic experiments. The first approa...
We show how to bound the effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices in sequential two-player ...
Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and ...
The evidence for belief-based guilt aversion is reviewed with a particular focus on trust games and ...
We combine choice data in the ultimatum game with the expectations of proposers elicited by subjecti...
We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences ...
Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. For exampl...
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pa...
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pa...
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pa...
This Zenodo project contains the files necessary to replicate the results of our study "Measuring be...
How does guilt affect participation in providing public goods? We characterise and analyse completel...
Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and ...
We compare three approaches to test for guilt aversion in two economic experiments. The first approa...
We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations eli...
We compare three approaches to test for guilt aversion in two economic experiments. The first approa...
We show how to bound the effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices in sequential two-player ...
Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and ...
The evidence for belief-based guilt aversion is reviewed with a particular focus on trust games and ...
We combine choice data in the ultimatum game with the expectations of proposers elicited by subjecti...
We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences ...
Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. For exampl...