Is Moral Scepticism Inevitable? An Enquiry on Desires, Goods and Moral Diversity in Dialogue with C. Taylor and A. MacIntyre.

Within contemporary plural societies it is very common to experience of moral diversity on various issues. Does this phenomenological account necessarily lead to accept moral subjectivism and skepticism as inevitable conclusions? If we tackle the issue from a foundationalist standpoint, it seems hard to find a common ground for dialogue. Moreover, the multiplication of desires and their claim to offer a normative criterion for human action might lead us to abandon the possibility of a common moral enterprise, and to delegate the solution of dilemmas to a system of norms or moral rules. While engaging in a critical dialogue with C. Taylor and M. MacIntyre, I will argue that we need to follow the path of practical reason in order to avoid skepticism, starting from common fundamental dispositions toward ‘good’ and ‘right’. Moreover, we do not need to overcome desires, as their dynamic leads us beyond the limits of moralism to discover a constellation. of meanings crucial for human life. Lastly, I will argue that the possibility of tackling moral disagreement without surrender to scepticism depends on a dialogue developed within a network of narratives interacting with each other through which practical reason can detect the incarnation of those goods worthy of our love and allegiance. Therefore, moral disagreement might be addressed, rather than from a dialectical perspective (responsible, in turn, of generating further oppositions), from a dialogical one, in which the ‘exchange of reasons’ (dià-logos) embodies the work of the practical reason within a narrative context