In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential games. The problem is to evaluate an unknown cost function given the observed trajectories that are known to be generated by a stationary linear feedback Nash equilibrium pair. Using the observed data, we construct a game that is equivalent to the game that leads to the observed trajectories in the sense that the equilibrium feedback law of any of the two player is the same for that player in the original and constructed games. Towards this end, we introduce a model-based algorithm that uses the given trajectories to accomplish this task. The algorithm combines both inverse optimal control and reinforcement learning methods making extensive u...
Differential games are an important mathematical tool for studying conflict in applications across e...
Differential games are an important mathematical\ud tool for studying conflict in applications acros...
This work addresses inverse dynamic games, which generalize the inverse problem of optimal control, ...
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential ...
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential ...
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential ...
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential ...
We consider the problem of computing parameters of player cost functionals such that given state and...
This letter addresses the inverse problem of differential games, where the aim is to compute cost fu...
We consider the problem of computing parameters of player cost functions in discrete-time nonzero-su...
We consider the problem of computing parameters of player cost functions in discrete-time nonzero-su...
In this paper, we consider the problem of inverse dynamic games: given the observed behaviour of pla...
In this paper, we consider the problem of inverse dynamic games: given the observed behaviour of pla...
University of Minnesota M.S.M.E. thesis. August 2019. Major: Mechanical Engineering. Advisors: Andre...
Differential games are an important mathematical tool for studying conflict in applications across e...
Differential games are an important mathematical tool for studying conflict in applications across e...
Differential games are an important mathematical\ud tool for studying conflict in applications acros...
This work addresses inverse dynamic games, which generalize the inverse problem of optimal control, ...
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential ...
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential ...
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential ...
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear–quadratic zero-sum differential ...
We consider the problem of computing parameters of player cost functionals such that given state and...
This letter addresses the inverse problem of differential games, where the aim is to compute cost fu...
We consider the problem of computing parameters of player cost functions in discrete-time nonzero-su...
We consider the problem of computing parameters of player cost functions in discrete-time nonzero-su...
In this paper, we consider the problem of inverse dynamic games: given the observed behaviour of pla...
In this paper, we consider the problem of inverse dynamic games: given the observed behaviour of pla...
University of Minnesota M.S.M.E. thesis. August 2019. Major: Mechanical Engineering. Advisors: Andre...
Differential games are an important mathematical tool for studying conflict in applications across e...
Differential games are an important mathematical tool for studying conflict in applications across e...
Differential games are an important mathematical\ud tool for studying conflict in applications acros...
This work addresses inverse dynamic games, which generalize the inverse problem of optimal control, ...