This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, but not vice versa, leads to heterogeneous matching. The analysis suggests that micro finance organizations can achieve the first best by offering asymmetric group contracts. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</p
This paper shows that, in a group-lending environment characterized by positive assortative matching...
The theory on group lending suggests that joint liability induces borrowers to form homogeneous grou...
The paper attempts to find the socially best loan contract by comparing exante welfare, interest and...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper examines joint liability loan contracts as part of a screening mechanism adopted by lende...
This paper looks at the group formation game in joint liability lending. We show that the formation ...
Group lending is a common practice that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) utilize when lending to ind...
This paper shows that, in a group-lending environment characterized by positive assortative matching...
This paper shows that, in a group-lending environment characterized by positive assortative matching...
The theory on group lending suggests that joint liability induces borrowers to form homogeneous grou...
The paper attempts to find the socially best loan contract by comparing exante welfare, interest and...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, bu...
This paper examines joint liability loan contracts as part of a screening mechanism adopted by lende...
This paper looks at the group formation game in joint liability lending. We show that the formation ...
Group lending is a common practice that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) utilize when lending to ind...
This paper shows that, in a group-lending environment characterized by positive assortative matching...
This paper shows that, in a group-lending environment characterized by positive assortative matching...
The theory on group lending suggests that joint liability induces borrowers to form homogeneous grou...
The paper attempts to find the socially best loan contract by comparing exante welfare, interest and...
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