White certificates for energy efficiency improvement with energy taxes:A theoretical economic model

In this paper we analyze interactions of two energy policy instruments, namely a White Certificates (WhC) scheme as an innovative policy instrument for energy efficiency improvement and energy taxation. These policy instruments differ in terms of objectives and final impacts on the price of electricity. We examine the effect of these policy instruments in the electricity sector, focusing on electricity producers and suppliers in a competitive market. Using microeconomic theory, we identify synergies between market players and demonstrate the total effect on the electricity price when suppliers internalize the behaviour of producers in their decisions. This model refers to an ideal market situation of full liberalization. The cases we examine consist of electricity producers with and without a carbon tax, electricity suppliers with and without an electricity tax, and with WhC obligations. Furthermore, we present a parallel implementation of WhC for electricity suppliers with carbon tax on electricity producers and an electricity tax with WhC obligations to electricity suppliers. We demonstrate differences in optimization behaviour of producers and suppliers. Based on a couple of cases of WhC with carbon and electricity taxes, various positive and negative effects of both schemes in terms of target achievement and efficiency are present, which can lead to an added value of such schemes in the policy mix, although uncertainties of outcomes are quite high. A basic finding is that in a merit order several parameters can increase final electricity price after the implementation of different policies: demand for electricity and electricity supply cost at a large scale and then follow the level of level of obligation for energy saving, level of penalty, and price of WhC (representing the marginal costs of energy saving projects). The impact magnitude of parameters depends on the values chosen and on the initial position of suppliers (i.e. if their actual behaviour deviates from full compliance with targets). (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.