In his model of a rent-seeking contest, [Tullock, G., 1980. Efficient rent seeking. In: Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D., Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A and M University Press, College Station, pp. 97-112] uses a simple concrete specification for the probability functions which determine the probability that a player wins the contest, given the bids made by the players. We discuss in general terms a set of conditions that can be imposed on probability functions in this game. Next, we show that the specification chosen by Tullock is the unique one that satisfies these conditions. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.</p
This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features...
It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking ...
We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant make...
In his model of a rent-seeking contest, [Tullock, G., 1980. Efficient rent seeking. In: Buchanan, J....
We consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players com...
This paper models success probability in imperfectly discriminating contests involving multiple play...
We consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players com...
textabstractThis paper reconsiders Tullock's analysis of rent seeking and wasteful overdissipation. ...
We consider a two-player Tullock rent-seeking contest with uncertain discriminatory power in the con...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restri...
This paper introduces a contest with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullo...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restri...
We offer a new explanation for the occurrence of delegation in rent-seeking contests. We consider a ...
This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features...
It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking ...
We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant make...
In his model of a rent-seeking contest, [Tullock, G., 1980. Efficient rent seeking. In: Buchanan, J....
We consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players com...
This paper models success probability in imperfectly discriminating contests involving multiple play...
We consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players com...
textabstractThis paper reconsiders Tullock's analysis of rent seeking and wasteful overdissipation. ...
We consider a two-player Tullock rent-seeking contest with uncertain discriminatory power in the con...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restri...
This paper introduces a contest with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullo...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restri...
We offer a new explanation for the occurrence of delegation in rent-seeking contests. We consider a ...
This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features...
It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking ...
We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant make...