The aftermath of the Swedish school reforms : Governmental need for monitoring and its view of schools as agents

This thesis examines the effects of the Swedish school reforms that took place in the early 1990’s. Theories such as Principal-Agent, Stewardship and Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy are discussed as well as New Public Management (NPM). These reforms were heavily influenced by NPM, causing an increased level of street-level bureaucracy, and according to Principal-Agent theory some outcomes could have been predicted. The predictions that Principal-Agent theory argues is that the changes that took place could spark an increased level of distrust and desire to monitor Swedish schools. To measure these reactions this thesis examines both national surveys on citizens level of trust towards Swedish elementary schools as well as government expenses for monitoring. The findings of this thesis indicate a clear increase in degree of need for government monitoring yet no increase in the citizens distrust in the elementary schools. This discrepancy cannot however be explained by this thesis but are discussed whether it relies on which type of questions was used in the study. In a concluding discussion the thesis ponder about how increased monitoring affects teacher discretion and presents two possible scenarios for future studies