Nec Pluribus Impar? De campagnes en onderhandelingen van Lodewijk XIV in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1707-1708

In this Master's Thesis in History, I examine the political, legal and diplomatic aspects of two campaigns fought in the Southern Netherlands during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701/1702-1713/1714). Although one might consider the 1707 campaign as irrelevant, since none of the main military events for the year took place in the Southern Netherlands, it is relevant to examine an "anodine" campaign. Warfare in the Grand Siècle (John Lynn) is not in the first place concerned with big battles and sieges, who add to the "Gloire" of the respective commanders. It is in essence a tactical and strategical game. Control of geographical zones, trade routes and supply points (Liddel Hart/Van Creveld) are the constant preoccupations of Louis XIV's "guerre de cabinet" (Emmanuel Pénicaut). We see for example that de duke of Vendôme, grandson to one of Henri IV's royal bastards, uses all his abilities to hold of the duke of Marlborough's coalition army in a frustrating campaign, thanks to a profound knowledge of the Low Countries' military theatre. In between two campaigns, French secret emissaries go to The Hague, in order to find a compromise with the Republic, to quit the Grand Alliance (1701) and to divide the possessions of the Spanish Monarchy between Philip of Anjou, Louis' grandson, and Archduke Charles of Habsburg, brother of Emperor Joseph I. These negotiations were fruitless, but did contain the main guidelines for the Peace of Utrecht, concluded 6 years later (1713). Nicolas Mesnager, who represented France on the Peace Congress, was already the director of the first talks in Holland. Devising an intelligent partition scheme of the trade with the Spanish Colonies, he almost lured the Dutch Regents into an agreement. These negotiations are an indication of the changing legal paradigm of international politics: whereas relations between monarchs were traditionally governed by family ties and norms of private law, politicians and jurists take the lead in the beginning of the 18th Century. Building on the famous pamphlet by François de Lisola (Bouclier d'Estat, 1667), they work out solutions bypassing absolute and non-reconcilable claims to territory. After the failed negotiations, the War resumes. 1708 brings the victory of Oudenaarde and the siege of Lille to the armies of Marlborough and prince Eugen of Savoy. We analysed the campaign in detail, to find that the former was not as destructive to the French army as British historians want us to believe. In fact, the previous fall of Ghent and Bruges (July 4-6, 1708) had a far more decisive impact on the allied troops' movements, since they cut off the provision roads to Antwerp and Ostend. Internal strife in the French army finally gave Lille, Ghent and Bruges to the allies in the closing months of the campaign. Behind it lie court intrigues in Versailles, where the clique behind the duke of Burgundy, young and inexperienced general in Flanders, opted for a return to tempered monarchy and a more traditional, feudal society. In opposition to this group (counting Fénelon, former preceptor to the young prince), the court around the "Grand Dauphin", Louis' son, gathered. Vendôme represented this second clique. Soon after the battle of Oudenaarde, pamphlets in Paris accused the prince of misconduct and even cowardice. The cabal was initiated through Alberoni, Vendômes secretary, whose accusing letter was published in the Gazette van Amsterdam, behind enemy lines. Five years after the 1708 campaign, the war comes to a diplomatic solution at Utrecht. Europe's map is redesigned, but according to Mesnager's scheme at The Hague, or to the Partition Treaties concluded already in 1697 and 1700 between Louis XIV and William III, at the time king of Great Britain and stadhouder in the Republic. Utrecht opens an era of relative stability in European politics, with an Anglo-French tandem setting up joint interventions to prevent an armed change of the settlement