This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud on shareholder valuation of firms between 2007 and 2016. From an examination of both monetary and non-monetary ‘name and shame’ penalties, it is reported all punishments have a negative and significant impact on the shareholder wealth of fraudulent firms. Investors perceive punishments involving monetary penalties far more severely than non-monetary punishments used to combat accounting fraud. Stock market reactions are also sensitive to the type of fraud committed with manipulation of recognition and disclosure fraud viewed more negatively by investors than fraud related to disclosure. Information leakage to capital markets prior to the announcement of pun...
AbstractReceiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts betw...
Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a fi...
We examine the causes and consequences of falsified financial statements in China. Using bivariate p...
This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud on shareholder ...
This study examines the relationship between the high reported levels of recidivism committed by Chi...
This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We docum...
The rising tide of corporate scandals and audit failures has shocked the public, and the integrity o...
This study investigates reputational penalties for two main types of corporate scandals in China: ac...
The rising tide of corporate scandals and audit failures has shocked the public, and the integrity o...
From 1978 through 2002, federal regulators brought 585 enforcement actions for financial misrepresen...
This study investigates the links between accounting values in Chinese listed companies’ balance she...
This thesis develops an analysis of the prevalence and determinants of financial fraud as identified...
This paper examines two types of financial reporting fraud (i.e., earnings manipulation fraud and tu...
This paper explores how managers’ and supervisors’ equity incentives impact the likelihood of commit...
AbstractReceiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts betw...
Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a fi...
We examine the causes and consequences of falsified financial statements in China. Using bivariate p...
This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud on shareholder ...
This study examines the relationship between the high reported levels of recidivism committed by Chi...
This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We docum...
The rising tide of corporate scandals and audit failures has shocked the public, and the integrity o...
This study investigates reputational penalties for two main types of corporate scandals in China: ac...
The rising tide of corporate scandals and audit failures has shocked the public, and the integrity o...
From 1978 through 2002, federal regulators brought 585 enforcement actions for financial misrepresen...
This study investigates the links between accounting values in Chinese listed companies’ balance she...
This thesis develops an analysis of the prevalence and determinants of financial fraud as identified...
This paper examines two types of financial reporting fraud (i.e., earnings manipulation fraud and tu...
This paper explores how managers’ and supervisors’ equity incentives impact the likelihood of commit...
AbstractReceiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts betw...
Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a fi...
We examine the causes and consequences of falsified financial statements in China. Using bivariate p...