Courage

The article attempts to present a modern version of the concept of courage, which now seems rather outdated. The rethinking of the concept begins with the analysis of a simple problem: modern philosophy appears to be virtually unconnected with courage or attached to it no value, but a quick review of the history of philosophy reveals that there seems to be no philosophy that would not contained the notion of courage. What, then, refers to the modern (at least philosophical) revocation and the maturity of courage? In seeking the answer to the question, the article begins with a critical discussion of the concept of courage, which is the basis for its general rejection, namely Aristotle's notion of courage. The article shows that Aristotle's conception transforms courage into a primary militaristic virtue, but at the same time it offers a concept that allows the concept of a courage to be derived, which is neither militaristic, nor essentially masculine. In conclusion, the paper reconsiders what the concept constitutes constitutively, in particular the unusual thickening operations and the displacement of anxiety. This ultimately enables us to show that what seems to be the most distinct at first sight is directly connected, namely, courage and fatalism