The Hubris hypothesis: you can self-enhance, but you'd better not show it

We tested whether and why observers dislike individuals who convey self-superiority through blatant social comparison (the hubris hypothesis). Participants read self-superiority claims (I am better than others; Experiments 17), noncomparative positive claims (I am good; Experiments 12, 4), self-equality claims (I am as good as others; Experiments 34, 6), temporally comparative self-superiority claims (I am better than I used to be; Experiment 5), other-superiority claims (S/he is better than others; Experiment 6), and self-superiority claims accompanied by persistent disclaimers (Experiment 7). They judged the claim and the claimant (Experiments 17) and made inferences about the claimant's self-view and view of others (Experiments 47) as well as the claimant's probable view of them (Experiment 7). Self-superiority claims elicited unfavorable evaluations relative to all other claims. Evaluation unfavorability was accounted for by the perception that the claimant implied a negative view of others (Experiments 46) and particularly of the observer (Experiment 7). Supporting the hubris hypothesis, participants disliked individuals who communicated self-superiority beliefs in an explicitly comparative manner. Self-superiority beliefs may provoke undesirable interpersonal consequences when they are explicitly communicated to others but not when they are disguised as noncomparative positive self-claims or self-improvement claims