A principal-agent investigation into the discretionary power of the European external action service : the case of the Eastern Partnership

To address the shortcomings of the European Union’s (EU) external action in rapidly changing international affairs and to prepare for the EU’s “Big Bang” enlargement, the EU member states and institutions convened in the European Convention in the beginning of 21st century (2002-2003). The proposal to establish the European External Action Service (EEAS) was the centrepiece of the EU’s renewed foreign policy architecture, having both institutional and decision-making implications. The analysis of the negotiation process since the Convention reveals that the EEAS is a product of the compromise between the integrationist and non-integrationist member states (MS), the Commission and the European Parliament. The compromise however resulted in the sui generis body, which is neither supranational nor intergovernmental, has linkages with the MS, is somewhat accountable to the European Parliament and is required to cooperate with the Commission. Although the EEAS was built on the EU’s existing structures, its innovative institutional composition is a new experiment for the EU that already had a very sophisticated institutional architecture. This dissertation adapts and applies the principal-agent model to the analysis of the rationales behind the establishment of the EEAS and its control by the MS. Building on the existing literature, this dissertation systematically applies the principal-agent model to the analysis of the EEAS. More specifically, this study addresses four interrelated questions, two of which are related to the EEAS in general: a) What is the rationale behind power delegation by the MS principal to the EEAS agent? b) What is the degree of discretionary power enjoyed by the EEAS agent vis-à-vis the MS? Principal-agent model assumes that an agent’s discretion vis-à-vis its principal may vary depending on the area of agent’s intervention. As a case study to investigate the EEAS discretion and explain its variation, this analysis selects the Eastern Partnership (2009) targeting the European neighbours of the EU, viz. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. More specifically this dissertation asks the following questions: c) What is the control and the discretion of EEAS’ action in the Eastern Partnership? d) What factor(s) explain (the variation of) the degree of the EEAS’ discretionary power? Methodologically, this dissertation follows a logic of iterative research design drawing on triangulation of the data collected from multiple sources: through analysis of the legal documents, journalistic articles, secondary academic and policy-oriented literature and 63 interviews conducted with the key actors in order to gain an insight into the behind-the-scenes struggles. The findings of this dissertation reveal that the MS control of the EEAS and its eventual discretion varies across the frameworks and policy areas. Specifically, the discretion of the EEAS is limited in the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework, very limited in the Eastern Partnership bilateral framework and extremely limited in the area of political dialogue (vs. sectoral cooperation). The sensitivity of policy area accounts for the variation of the EEAS’ discretion. This is a striking finding in light of the declared rationale and promise initiated in the European Convention, i.e. the establishment of the EEAS was intended to be a game changer for EU foreign policy. In rhetoric, the EEAS was created to enact more coherent and effective EU foreign policy. However, in reality the MS have not been willing to transfer powers to the EU level and thus have not empowered the EEAS to lead the EU in its external policy. The MS principals remain puppet masters pulling the strings of the EEAS agent especially when faced with a sensitive area of policy