EU trade policy reaction to the BIC: from accommodation to entrenchment

The transformation of the international trade regime became patently clear at the 2003 Cancún Summit of the World Trade Organization (WTO), where the emerging economies formed the G20 group in reaction to an EU–US pre-agreement in the agriculture arena. The failure of Cancún marked the end of the dominance of Western powers shaping the future governance of international trade unilaterally. In a context of growing multipolarity, the Doha Development Round (DDR) has continued to muddle on without clear prospects of completion. This chapter examines the EU’s response to this new context. It argues that the EU fi rst took on an accommodation strategy towards the emerging powers. First, it accepted them in the core decision-making groups of the Doha negotiations (the so-called New Quad, the Five Interested Parties, the G6 and the G7). Second, it dropped the Singapore issues and made several concessions to their demands in the agricultural area. Third, it launched the Global Europe trade approach that focused on free trade arrangements with them. In 2009, however, the EU shifted its strategy towards entrenchment. It announced that it would not be offering further concessions to emerging powers. Moreover, the EU radicalised its free trade strategy, engaging in free trade negotiations with Japan, Canada and even the US, much to the discontent of China. This shift from accommodation to entrenchment suggests that the latter is a second-best option for the EU. It is partly the result of factors that could not be controlled by the EU. Moreover, it signifi es a different, more dangerous and less straightforward way to pursue a multilateral agreement