Paving the way for an evolutionary social constructivism

The idea has recently taken root that evolutionary theory and social constructivism are less antagonistic than most theorists thought, and we have even seen attempts to integrate social constructivist and evolutionary approaches to human thought and behaviour. D.S. Wilson, for instance, sees evolutionary social constructivism (ESC) as a middle ground between two well-known extreme claims, namely that the human mind is a flexible and general-purpose learning device, and that the mind should be seen as a kind of Swiss army knife made up of adapted specialized tools. However, if one wants to set social constructivism on an evolutionary foundation, one must not neglect to take into account its more specific claims. Hence, we discuss four core elements of social constructivism – essentializing reason; dominance and subordination; narratives and identities; theory-ladenness of observation – and suggest how they may be incorporated into evolutionary thinking, by considering ways in which evolution can explain why we socially construct things, rather than trying to explain them directly. Moreover, we focus on the neglected possible interdisciplinary traffic from social constructivism toward evolutionary approaches to human behaviour. (1) Essentializing Reason – Social constructivists analyze both how and why concepts and their transformations induce people to think the way they do, and what influence these transformations have on our behaviour. The concept of “mental illness” is a good example of our tendency to treat cultural artifacts as natural kinds. While many evolutionists agree with social constructivists that psychological essentialism is often ontologically unwarranted, this core element may lead to insights on how to counteract socially unwarranted instances of (adaptive) essentialist thinking. (2) Dominance and Subordination – It is assumed that “reason” is, at least partially, a function of nonreasonable processes, and that these nonreasonable forces are closely related to power (control/dominance over others/nature). The so-called “birth of the addict” illustrates how socio-cultural practices can override our inborn desire for power and status. This in turn leads us to look further for evolutionary explanations for why some of us willingly accept the concepts and thought processes determining our subordination. (3) Narratives and Identities – The influence of the conceptual transformations can also be seen in the use of narratives to structure our world and in the identities with which we attempt to navigate it: narratives shape reality itself. Here, both the use of stories as more or less trustworthy guides in a dangerous world, and the fact that nongenetic input is required to endow us with human identities, already gained some foothold in evolutionary theorizing about human behaviour. (4)Theory-Ladenness of Observation – Finally, social constructivists hold that scientific theories do not escape the general theory-ladenness of human observations. Combining moderate social-constructivist perspectives with evolutionary theory’s modular view of the mind allows us to shed light on how exactly the innate theory-ladenness of observation affects scientific theorizing, as well as helps us to explain why science is not immune to knowledge acquired through social transmission. Using the examples of comparative legal theory, same-sex sexual behaviour / homosexuality, and inbreeding avoidance / incest, we proceed to show how ESC can (a) reorient existing debates, (b) correct naive versions of both evolutionary approaches to human behaviour and social constructivism, and (c) generate new research hypotheses. In short, ESC is likely to be an indispensable building block for realizing the synthetic potential evolutionary theory has to offer to the social sciences