Add to ORKGA single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
We consider the allocation problem of a single indivisible object to one of several agents under the...
We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social outcomes. We...
We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types ...
The problem of allocating a single indivisible object to one of several selfish agents is considered...
The problem of allocating a single indivisible object to one of several selfish agents is considered...
A VCG mechanism to assign p identical objects is feasible is cash transfers yield no deficit. The ef...
A VCG mechanism to assign p identical objects is feasible is cash transfers yield no deficit. The ef...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at ...
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at ...
Chapter 1: Under the average common value function, we select almost uniquely the mechanism that giv...
We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Ra...
In unit-demand and multi-copy object allocation problems, we say that a mechanism size-wise dominat...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
We consider the allocation problem of a single indivisible object to one of several agents under the...
We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social outcomes. We...
We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types ...
The problem of allocating a single indivisible object to one of several selfish agents is considered...
The problem of allocating a single indivisible object to one of several selfish agents is considered...
A VCG mechanism to assign p identical objects is feasible is cash transfers yield no deficit. The ef...
A VCG mechanism to assign p identical objects is feasible is cash transfers yield no deficit. The ef...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at ...
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at ...
Chapter 1: Under the average common value function, we select almost uniquely the mechanism that giv...
We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Ra...
In unit-demand and multi-copy object allocation problems, we say that a mechanism size-wise dominat...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
We consider the allocation problem of a single indivisible object to one of several agents under the...
We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social outcomes. We...