Add to ORKGIn the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Since independence in 1956, Tunisia has experienced a significant reduction of poverty and improveme...
In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agr...
International audienceWe formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the productio...
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the ...
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the ...
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the ...
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the ...
On the Allocative Efficiency of Agricultural Tenancy Contracts : Was Cheung Right ? In the presence...
On the Allocative Efficiency of Agricultural Tenancy Contracts : Was Cheung Right ? In the presence...
Agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries. Output sharing rules that mak...
This article uses recent survey data from the Kayes area (Western Mali) to estimate the effect of mi...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Since independence in 1956, Tunisia has experienced a significant reduction of poverty and improveme...
In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agr...
International audienceWe formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the productio...
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the ...
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the ...
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the ...
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the ...
On the Allocative Efficiency of Agricultural Tenancy Contracts : Was Cheung Right ? In the presence...
On the Allocative Efficiency of Agricultural Tenancy Contracts : Was Cheung Right ? In the presence...
Agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries. Output sharing rules that mak...
This article uses recent survey data from the Kayes area (Western Mali) to estimate the effect of mi...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able ...
Since independence in 1956, Tunisia has experienced a significant reduction of poverty and improveme...