Add to ORKGRecent game-theoretic analyses of the adversarial process have focused on the ability of courts to render accurate verdicts in light of selectively reported evidence. This paper generalizes previous work by developing a game where the court’s decision to weigh evidence and litigants’ information-gathering and reporting strategies are endogenously determined, and examines the effects on the players’ equilibrium strategies of varying the informational endowments of the litigants concerning the true value of the parameter under dispute. We find that litigants’ strategies are driven by their knowledge of the court’s potential strategic behavior and prior beliefs, which are non-neutral with respect to trial results.Fundação para a Ciênci...
The plea bargaining mechanism in criminal procedure serves as a favorable screening device, separati...
In order to evaluate fully the advantage claimed for the adversary model we sought to add a third el...
The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter we study a com-munication game played by...
Recent game-theoretic analyses of the adversarial process have focused on the ability of courts to r...
In this paper, we characterize adversarial decision-making as a choice between competing interpretat...
In this article, we characterize adversarial decision making as a choice between competing interpret...
Chapter 1 studies the properties of the two most commonly used legal institutions, the inquisitorial...
In this article, we characterize adversarial decision making as a choice between competing interpret...
We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public information about ...
In this article we attempt to determine the impact of a defendant's strategic choice of trial mode o...
In this article we attempt to determine the impact of a defendant's strategic choice of trial mode o...
Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts...
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may pres...
We develop a model of statistical evidence with a sophisticated Bayesian fact-finder. The context is...
periments. We also thank Tim Feddersen, Susanne Lohmann, Krishna Ladha, the audiences at several aca...
The plea bargaining mechanism in criminal procedure serves as a favorable screening device, separati...
In order to evaluate fully the advantage claimed for the adversary model we sought to add a third el...
The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter we study a com-munication game played by...
Recent game-theoretic analyses of the adversarial process have focused on the ability of courts to r...
In this paper, we characterize adversarial decision-making as a choice between competing interpretat...
In this article, we characterize adversarial decision making as a choice between competing interpret...
Chapter 1 studies the properties of the two most commonly used legal institutions, the inquisitorial...
In this article, we characterize adversarial decision making as a choice between competing interpret...
We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public information about ...
In this article we attempt to determine the impact of a defendant's strategic choice of trial mode o...
In this article we attempt to determine the impact of a defendant's strategic choice of trial mode o...
Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts...
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may pres...
We develop a model of statistical evidence with a sophisticated Bayesian fact-finder. The context is...
periments. We also thank Tim Feddersen, Susanne Lohmann, Krishna Ladha, the audiences at several aca...
The plea bargaining mechanism in criminal procedure serves as a favorable screening device, separati...
In order to evaluate fully the advantage claimed for the adversary model we sought to add a third el...
The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter we study a com-munication game played by...