Poison Pills : A management-shareholder benefits comparison

Abstract Problem: The problem of this thesis involves the controversy that the implementation of poison pills generates. The conflict amongst various stakeholders that are affected directly or indirectly by the implementation of the poison pill also contributes significantly to the problem of this thesis. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and compare the benefits of the poison pill adoption on shareholder and management interests. We also seek to evaluate arguments for and against pill adoption, and determine if these arguments are valid in view of facts established from our study. Conclusions: Our study in this thesis has brought us to five conclusions about the poison pill policy in fulfillment of the purpose. We state in our conclusion that arguments for and against the poison pill can both be validated depending on the case, we also state that a general conclusion cannot be drawn as to the negative or positive effect of the poison pill on stakeholders. We proceed to argue that the pill is a very effective fighting toll in the current business world and state that more should be done to regulate pill implementation. We finish up our conclusion by identifying what appears to be an inverse relationship between management and shareholders benefits from the implementation of the pill. Originality: The uniqueness of our study resides in the theoretical framework that is developed from two prevailing hypotheses in the academic research of the poison pill. The previous studies either take on the management entrenchment hypothesis (MEH) or the shareholder interest hypothesis (SIH). However, we have combined the elements of both hypotheses and jointly revealed the advantages and disadvantages of the pill adoption for both management and shareholders via our original management shareholder benefits comparison matrix