Adding Fuel to the Flames? Foreign Aid Bypassing and Political Support in Recipients

Foreign aid scholars argue that donors outsource development assistance to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because of poor governance and capacity constraints in aid recipients. But what shapes recipient citizens’ preference for aid delivery channels? How does foreign aid bypassing affect government support in recipients? Drawing on the logic of selective evaluation and micro-performance hypothesis, I contend that greater concern for quality of governance will positively influence support for foreign aid channeling through NGOs among aid recipients. Additionally, favorable attitude towards foreign aid bypassing will be negatively associated with government approval. Finally, an increase in foreign aid bypassing will be associated with lower approval for recipient governments. My dissertation project involves a case study on Bangladesh. I draw on data from an original survey administered on a nationally representative sample of Bangladeshi respondents. In the first empirical chapter, I examine the correlates of support for aid delivery channels in Bangladesh. I find evidence that preference for aid delivery mechanisms is associated with perceptions of corruption. The second empirical chapter examines the relationship between preferences for aid bypassing and approval for the incumbent administration in Bangladesh. I find evidence that NGO aid preference is negatively associated with approval for members of the Parliament. In the third empirical chapter, I employ multi-level modelling techniques using public opinion data from 2005 to 2019 to examine the association between foreign aid bypassing and approval for incumbents in recipient states in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. Results show that greater inflows of NGO aid is negatively associated with recipient citizens’ approval for the incumbent administration. Evidences from my analyses illustrate donor governments’ and recipient citizens’ mutual pursuit of enhancing aid effectiveness. However, donor sidestepping of recipient governments in aid delivery indicate that capacity constraints impeding state provision of quality public services remain unaddressed, with consequences for political support. Foreign aid bypassing may lower aid capture, but it may not be conducive in ensuring sustainability in aid effectiveness, owing to persistent deficits in public service delivery and ensuing political instability in recipients