In order to induce people to follow rules, sanctions are often introduced. In this paper we argue for the importance of studying the positive influence of sanctioning systems on people’s moral convictions regarding the rule advocated by the sanction and of studying factors that moderate this influence. In three experiments we tested the influence of sanction severity and showed that severe sanctions evoke stronger moral judgments with regard to rule-breaking behavior and stronger social disapproval towards rule-breakers than mild sanctions. This was particularly the case when trust in authorities is high rather than low. Implications of these findings are discussed. Also, a framework is proposed to understand the possible circumstance...
Objectives: Both scholars and legal practitioners have long theorized that a central function of cri...
Recent work shows that both reward and punishment systems increase short-term cooperation in social ...
Governments sometimes promote rules backed by sanctions too weak to make obedience privately optimal...
Sanctions not only have the instrumental function of deterring people from undesired behavior but th...
Building on theoretical notions that severe sanctions (more than mild ones) can communicate that sa...
The present research shows that, like financial sanctions, social punishment (the mere expression of...
The present research shows that, like financial sanctions, social punishment (the mere expression of...
Authorities frequently justify their sanctions as attempts to deter people from rule breaking. Altho...
Building on theoretical notions that severe sanctions (more than mild ones) can communicate that san...
Over the past two decades, organizations have established sanctioning systems as an important compon...
Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are created or modifie...
Informal sanctions are actions taken in response to behaviour to encourage conformity or discourage ...
Norm violators demonstrate that they can behave as they wish, which makes them appear powerful. Pote...
This article shows that reputational sanctions are not, as the literature implicitly assumes, indepe...
Sanctioning increases cooperation in public goods games, but not indiscriminately under all conditio...
Objectives: Both scholars and legal practitioners have long theorized that a central function of cri...
Recent work shows that both reward and punishment systems increase short-term cooperation in social ...
Governments sometimes promote rules backed by sanctions too weak to make obedience privately optimal...
Sanctions not only have the instrumental function of deterring people from undesired behavior but th...
Building on theoretical notions that severe sanctions (more than mild ones) can communicate that sa...
The present research shows that, like financial sanctions, social punishment (the mere expression of...
The present research shows that, like financial sanctions, social punishment (the mere expression of...
Authorities frequently justify their sanctions as attempts to deter people from rule breaking. Altho...
Building on theoretical notions that severe sanctions (more than mild ones) can communicate that san...
Over the past two decades, organizations have established sanctioning systems as an important compon...
Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are created or modifie...
Informal sanctions are actions taken in response to behaviour to encourage conformity or discourage ...
Norm violators demonstrate that they can behave as they wish, which makes them appear powerful. Pote...
This article shows that reputational sanctions are not, as the literature implicitly assumes, indepe...
Sanctioning increases cooperation in public goods games, but not indiscriminately under all conditio...
Objectives: Both scholars and legal practitioners have long theorized that a central function of cri...
Recent work shows that both reward and punishment systems increase short-term cooperation in social ...
Governments sometimes promote rules backed by sanctions too weak to make obedience privately optimal...