Om drømme, almenpsykologi og psykoterapi

Det hævdes i udgangspunktet, at vi ikke ved, hvorfor vi drømmer og hvorfor vi drømmer som vi gør. Denne uvidenhed bygger på etbredt empirisk grnndlagfremskaffet i de år som er gået efter opdagelsen i 1953 af sammenhængen mellem REM-søvn og de drømme vi husker. Uklarheden fremgår både af de mere biologisk betonede studier af REM-søvn og i de mere psykologisk betonede studier af drømmes indhold. Hobsons & McCarleys model af REM-søvnens biomekanik og Engelsteds teori om REM-søvnens fylogenese bliver kommenteret. Evans & Newmans og Crick & Mitchisons informationsteoretiske teorier om drømmesøvnens funktion bliver fremstillet og diskuteres kort. Foulkes forskning præsenteres og nogle pointer fra hans fremstilling af drømme som kognition fremdrages. Artiklen afsluttes med nogle bemærkninger om brngen af drømme i psykoterapi, hvor en sondring trækkes mellem en analysepræget brug og en oplevelsesorienteret brug af drømmematerialet. Vanskeligheden medat sammenkæde terapierfaringer fra arbejdet med drømme og de almenpsykologiske erfaringer påpeges, og begrundes i det terapeutiske arbejdes praktiske karakter. Den oplevelsesorienterede arbejdsform illustreres med en historie om et arbejde med en drøm. Nogle spørgsmål til kognitionspsykologerne formuleres med baggrund i erfaringerne fra det terapeutiske arbejde.It is asserted from the outset that we do not know why we dream or why we dream as we do. This ignorance is based on vast amounts of empirical material brought forward since the discovery in 1953 of the connection between REM-sleep and the dreams we remember. The uncertainty is derived both from the biological research on REM-sleep and the more psychological studies of dream content. Hobson & McCarley's model of the biomechanics of REM-sleep and Engelsteds theory of the fylogenetic development of REM-sleep is commented upon. Evans & Newman's and Crick & Mitchison's computer based theories of the function dreamsleep is summarised and discussed. The research efforts of Foulkes is presented and some of his main points in understanding dreams as cognition is highlighted. The article concludes with some remarks on the use of dreamsin psychotherapy. A distinction is made between analysis of the dream material in the sessions and the experiential use of it. The difficulty with connecting experiences from work with dreams in psychotherapy and the conceptualisations of general psychologyis pointed out. The difficulty is understood as a necessary consequence of the faet that psychotherapy essentially is a practical skil!. A tale of a therapeutic session working with a dream is told, as an illustration of the experiential use of dreams in therapy. Two requests, based on experiences from therapy, is presented to the cognitive psychologists. The first request is for more clarified notions of how metaphors function in the human cognition. The second request is for a model of memory that recognises thebasic organising function of affects and feelings