It is known that the core of an economy with externalities may be empty. We consider two concepts of dominance that allow us to prove that the set formed by individually rational, Pareto optimal allocations is stable and coincides with the core that, consequently, is non-empty
For an exchange economy, under assumptions which did not bring about the existence of equilibrium wi...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exh...
A mass-economy is one with many, many agents where each agent is negligible and each trading group i...
We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and prove its existence. Stable sets provi...
We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and address the existence problem. The imp...
extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders [7] for continuum economies wi...
Second version: November, 1995. This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammo...
It is well known that the core of an exchange market with indivisible goods is always non empty, alt...
Within the framework of (pure) exchange economies, we demonstrate that the von Neumann and Morgenste...
We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents’ preferences possibly exh...
Abstract. We consider a situation where coalitions are formed to divide a resource. As in real life,...
We show that the (interim) fine core of an atomless exchange economy with differential information i...
Core existence results are proved for exchange economies with an infinite dimensional commodity spa...
An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that r...
For an exchange economy, under assumptions which did not bring about the existence of equilibrium wi...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exh...
A mass-economy is one with many, many agents where each agent is negligible and each trading group i...
We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and prove its existence. Stable sets provi...
We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and address the existence problem. The imp...
extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders [7] for continuum economies wi...
Second version: November, 1995. This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammo...
It is well known that the core of an exchange market with indivisible goods is always non empty, alt...
Within the framework of (pure) exchange economies, we demonstrate that the von Neumann and Morgenste...
We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents’ preferences possibly exh...
Abstract. We consider a situation where coalitions are formed to divide a resource. As in real life,...
We show that the (interim) fine core of an atomless exchange economy with differential information i...
Core existence results are proved for exchange economies with an infinite dimensional commodity spa...
An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that r...
For an exchange economy, under assumptions which did not bring about the existence of equilibrium wi...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exh...
A mass-economy is one with many, many agents where each agent is negligible and each trading group i...
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