Knowledge as de re true belief?

Kratzer proposed a causal analysis of knowledge in which knowledge is defined as a form of de re belief of facts. In support of Kratzer's view, I think the de re/de dicto distinction can be used to integrally account for the original Gettier cases, but in contrast to Kratzer, I think such an account does not fundamentally require a distinction between facts and true propositions. I then discuss whether this account might give us a reductive analysis of knowledge as de re true belief. Like Kratzer, I think it will not, in particular the distinction seems inadequate to account for Ginet-Goldman cases of causally connected but unreliable belief. Nevertheless, I argue that the de re belief analysis allows us to account for a distinction Starmans and Friedman recently introduced between apparent evidence and authentic evidence in their empirical study of Gettier cases, in a way that questions their claim that a causal disconnect is not operative in the contrasts they found