Pure Nash equilibria are foundational to the field of game theory. We use a "random games" approach to understand both how likely Nash equilibria are to exist, and also how effective various iterative procedures are at locating them. We address games with many players that can each choose from two actions (and introduce a novel connection between game theory and percolation theory), and games with two players that can choose from many actions. We also allow for ties in the scores that players can earn in these games, which yields many different game behaviours
International audienceIf a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the...
International audienceHow many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at...
John F Nash (1950) proposed dynamics for repeated interactions accordingto which agents myopically p...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are m...
In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are m...
In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are m...
In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are m...
In 1950, Nash proposed a natural equilibrium solution concept for games hence called Nash equilibriu...
We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of ...
International audienceHow many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at...
International audienceIf a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the...
International audienceHow many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at...
John F Nash (1950) proposed dynamics for repeated interactions accordingto which agents myopically p...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To asses...
In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are m...
In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are m...
In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are m...
In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are m...
In 1950, Nash proposed a natural equilibrium solution concept for games hence called Nash equilibriu...
We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of ...
International audienceHow many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at...
International audienceIf a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the...
International audienceHow many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at...
John F Nash (1950) proposed dynamics for repeated interactions accordingto which agents myopically p...