zkFaith: Soonami's Zero-Knowledge Identity Protocol

Individuals are encouraged to prove their eligibility to access specific services regularly. However, providing various organizations with personal data spreads sensitive information and endangers people's privacy. Hence, privacy-preserving identification systems that enable individuals to prove they are permitted to use specific services are required to fill the gap. Cryptographic techniques are deployed to construct identity proofs across the internet; nonetheless, they do not offer complete control over personal data or prevent users from forging and submitting fake data. In this paper, we design a privacy-preserving identity protocol called "zkFaith." A new approach to obtain a verified zero-knowledge identity unique to each individual. The protocol verifies the integrity of the documents provided by the individuals and issues a zero-knowledge-based id without revealing any information to the authenticator or verifier. The zkFaith leverages an aggregated version of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme to sign the user's commitment to the verified personal data. Then the users with a zero-knowledge proof system can prove that they own the required attributes of the access criterion of the requested service providers. Vector commitment and their position binding property enables us to, later on, update the commitments based on the modification of the personal data; hence update the issued zkFaith id with no requirement of initiating the protocol from scratch. We show that the design and implementation of the zkFaith with the generated proofs in real-world scenarios are scalable and comparable with the state-of-the-art schemes