Deflationary realism: Representation and idealisation in cognitive science

Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate between robustly realist views and various anti‐realist options. I defend an alternative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justified by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model, deflationary realism avoids the problems with robust realist views, while keeping allegiance to realism.This research was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy—EXC 2002/1 “Science of Intelligence”—Project number 390523135 http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001659Peer Reviewe